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THE PATENT MISUSE DOCTRINE: A BALANCE OF
PATENT RIGHTS AND THE PUBLIC INTEREST
The progress of private free enterprise is dependent upon the pro-
motion of technological development and the protection of free com-
petitive markets. Recognizing the importance of these factors and
realizing the necessity of their continued existence, the federal govern-
ment has acted to secure these objectives. To promote technology, the
Constitution embodies a theory rewarding inventive genius "by
securing for limited Times to . . , Inventors the exclusive Right to their
. . . Discoveries."' Federal patent statutes have been in effect con-
tinuously since 1790.2
 The continued existence of free competition in
open markets has been promoted through the enactment of various
antitrust statutes such as the Sherman Act of 1890,' the Clayton Act,4
and the Federal Trade Commission Act' which form the core of present
antitrust policy. They prohibit monopolies, monopolization, combina-
tions in restraint of trade, unfair competition, price fixing and other eco-
nomic abuses designed to restrain trade and suppress competition.
Without constitutional protection, the patent holder's exclusive
right to his invention would violate the principle of free competition
underlying the antitrust laws. Even with that protection, however, the
patentee's conduct has not been allowed to go unchecked, for his patent
rights are limited.
Historically, the doctrine of "patent misuse" has been applied to
keep the use of the patent within the limits set by the original grant
and thus avoid any clash with the antitrust laws. Originally, the doc-
trine was grounded on a violation of patent policy itself.' Recently,
however, certain anticompetitive licensing practices have prompted the
Supreme Court to utilize the broader standards of antitrust in applying
the doctrine of patent misuse. It has been maintained that such an ap-
proach contravenes the basic policy behind the patent grant 7 and fore-
shadows a permanent subordination of that policy to the antitrust
standards of restraining trade and lessening competition. This comment
questions the validity of that observation in light of both the recent
decision of Zenith Radio Corp. v. Hazeltine Research, Inc. 8
 and the
earlier patent-antitrust cases. Zenith resolves the basic question
whether every finding of patent misuse is a per se violation of the
antitrust laws or whether the patent misuse doctrine maintains its
1 U.S. Const. art. I, § 8.
2
 As codified in 1952, the patent statutes appear in 35 U.S.C. §§ 1-295 (1964).
3
 15 U.S.C. § 1 et seq. (1964).
4
 15 U.S.C. § 13 et seq. (1964).
5 15 U.S.C. § 41 et seq. (1964).
8
 Morton Salt Co. v. G. S. Suppiger Co., 314 U.S. 488, 491-92 (1942). See also
Nicoson, Misuse of the Misuse Doctrine In Infringement Suits, 9 U.C.L.A. L. Rev. 76
(1962).
7 See Nicoson, supra note 6.
8 395 U.S. 100 (1969).
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independent status as a check on the patentee's conduct apart from the
application of antitrust principles. By upholding the independent status
of the patent misuse doctrine Zenith achieves the necessary balance
between the patentee's legitimate rights under the patent grant and the
public interest in safeguarding competitive market opportunities.
I. Zenith Radio Corp. v. Hazeltine Research, Inc.'
Zenith Radio Corporation (Zenith) had been actively engaged in
the acquisition of licenses to use patented devices in the manufacture
of its radio and television sets. Many of these patent licenses had
been acquired from Hazeltine Research, Inc. (HRI) whose sole busi-
ness is the ownership and licensing of domestic patents principally in
the radio and television industry. HRI is a wholly owned subsidiary
of Hazeltine Corporation, a larger and more diversified company.
After Zenith's rejection of HRI's offer to renew a patent license,
the latter brought suit against Zenith claiming that Zenith's television
sets infringed some of HRI's patents. Zenith answered by alleging the
invalidity of the patents involved, non-infringement and patent misuse.
More than three years later, Zenith filed a counterclaim seeking treble
damages and injunctive relief. The counterclaim alleged violations of
the Sherman Act by a misuse of the HRI patents and a conspiracy
among HRI, Hazeltine Corporation and certain foreign patent pools.
For the purpose of this comment, only the domestic patent misuse
issue will be discussed.
HRI's patent licensing policy was to grant a so-called standard
package license. This package included all HRI patents and provided
that no infringement suit would be instituted during the five year term
of the agreement. In addition, this standard package license provided
for royalties computed on the basis of the licensee's entire production
regardless of whether its products utilized any of HRI's patents.
Prior to the initiation of the infringement suit Zenith had the stan-
dard HRI patent package license. Toward the end of the last five-year
licensing period, HRI requested that the license be renewed for
another five-year period at the prevailing package rate of $50,000 per
year. Zenith declined this initial offer to renew, contending that it did
not require a license under any of the patents in the package.
During the period beginning with Zenith's refusal to accept the
initial offer and ending with the actual commencement of trial, HRI
continuously asserted that Zenith was infringing some of HRI's patents
and that the only alternative to Zenith's acceptance of one of several
offers made during this period was costly infringement litigation. Two
of these offers are of particular importance since they form the basis of
the misuse issue.
The first offer provided that any one patent in the package would
be licensed at 50 per cent of the royalty rate for the entire package con-
9 The following facts appear in Hazeltine Research, Inc. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 388
F.2d 25, 33-35 (7th Cir. 1967).
47
BOSTON COLLEGE INDUSTRIAL AND COMMERCIAL LAW REVIEW
sisting of more than 500 patents and patent applications. Any two
patents would be licensed at 80 per cent of the package rate and any
three or more at 100 per cent of the package rate. It was provided that
all licenses accepted under the above formula would be subject to the
terms and conditions of the standard package form of license including
the payment of royalties computed on the basis of all of Zenith's pro-
duction regardless of whether any patent was employed or not.
The second offer proposed the licensing of nine color patents
claimed to be infringed at an annual rate of $435,000 or, the licensing
of all color patents at an annual rate of $500,000. As an alternative to
the latter proposals, HRI again offered its standard package license
covering all of its patents, both monochrome (black and white) as well
as color, for a maximum annual royalty rate of $150,000. Zenith re-
jected both the 50%-80%-100% offer and the $435,000-$500,000-
$150,000 offer.
The district court held that both offers constituted a misuse of
HRI's patents because by insisting on those offers HRI was (1) at-
tempting to coerce Zenith's acceptance of a five year package and
(2) insisting on deriving royalties from unpatented products. 1° There-
fore, on the misuse issue, judgment was entered for Zenith and an
injunction was issued enjoining HRI from further misuse.
On appeal, the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit affirmed
the treble damage award against HRI but modified the district court's
injunction.' Specifically, with respect to the practice of package
licensing, the court found that there was substantial evidence in the
record to support a finding of misuse inherent in HRI's $435,000-
$500,000-$150,000 license offer because by that offer HRI was at-
tempting to unlawfully coerce the acceptance of unwanted patents. 12
The court, however, reversed the lower court's holding that the 50 per
cent for one, 80 per cent for two, 100 per cent for three license proposal
was a misuse stating that such a formula was not unlawful economic
coercion and thus not a patent misuse. The court based its holding on
the fact that "W here were only three HRI patents in general use in
1959 and therefore the formula appears reasonable in light of com-
mercial realities."' Also, the court reversed the district court's finding
10 See Hazeltine Research, Inc. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 239 F. Supp. 51 (ND.
Ill. 1965). With respect to the package licensing issue, the court stated:
Plaintiff's offer to license its patents individually but at royalty rates far
in excess of the package rate was never an alternative to its controlling policy
to grant defendant a license only under all of its patents. . . . Although it may
be said that the Hazeltine proposals on the surface were offers to treat of
individual patents, the design was quite apparent—to force by unlawful coer-
cion the acceptance of unwanted patents. This constituted an illegal extension
of the patent monopolies. 239 F. Supp. at 77.
With respect to the royalty base provision, the court stated that: "a patentee has no
right to demand or force the payment of royalties on unpatented products." 239 F. Supp.
at 77.
11
 388 F.2d 25 (7th Cir. 1967).
12 Id. at 34.
la Id.
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that royalties based on a percentage of total sales constituted patent
misuse."
In view of the fact that the court of appeals affirmed the award
of treble damages based on the package licensing practice and that
HRI did not challenge that award, the Supreme Court addressed itself
solely to the question of the legality of computing royalties on the basis
of total sales regardless of the use of the patented item." Mr. Justice
White, writing for the majority, held that "conditioning the grant of a
patent license upon payment of royalties on products which do not
use the teaching of the patent does amount to patent misuse."" (Em-
phasis added.) The opinion turns on the word "conditioning," for the
Court made it clear that if the parties for their mutual convenience
decide to base their royalties on a percentage of the total sales regard-
less of use, no misuse exists.' The Court recognized the legitimate
right of a patentee to profit from his patent but pointed out that there
are "established limits which the patentee must not exceed in employ-
ing the leverage of his patent to control or limit the operations of the
licensee"
The broad issue resolved by Zenith is whether every finding of
patent misuse necessarily involves a violation of the antitrust laws.
Prior to Zenith it was not firmly settled that a finding of patent misuse
does not constitute a per se violation of the antitrust laws. The Zenith
decision removes any lingering uncertainty on this question since the
Court states that
if there was such a patent misuse, it does not necessarily
follow that the misuse embodies the ingredients of a viola-
tion of either § 1 or § 2 of the Sherman Act, or that Zenith
was threatened by a violation so as to entitle it to an injunc-
tion under § 16 of the Clayton Act."
Before analyzing in detail the package licensing and royalty base
issues presented by Zenith, it is necessary to examine the nature of the
patent grant and the judicial evolution of the doctrine of patent mis-
use. Of particular importance are the issues of whether the patent and
antitrust laws are in conflict, and whether the Court correctly decided
that every patent misuse is not a per se violation of the antitrust laws.
14 Id. at 39.
15 395 U.S. at 133.
16 Id. at 135.
17 The Court states:
The trial court's injunction does not purport to prevent the parties from
serving their mutual convenience by basing royalties on the sale of all radios
and television sets, irrespective of the use of HRI's inventions. The injunction
reaches only situations where the patentee directly or indirectly "conditions" his
license upon the payment of royalties on unpatented products. . . .
Id.
18 Id. at 136.
19 Id. at 140.
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II. PATENT MISUSE: THE INTERRELATIONSHIP OF PATENT AND
ANTITRUST POLICY
The owner of a patent is given the exclusive right to make, use
and sell the patented invention for a period of seventeen years."
Viewed from this standpoint, the patent grant is a limited monopoly.
The term "monopoly", however, must be used carefully in the antitrust
and patent contexts because of its changing connotation. Practically
speaking, a patent has a monopolistic aspect, namely, the right to
exclude others and sell alone; conceptually, however, it is not the type
of monopoly against which the antitrust laws are directed. In fact, the
Supreme Court has said:
a patent is not, accurately speaking, a monopoly. . . . The
term "monopoly" connotes the giving of an exclusive priv-
ilege for buying, selling, working or using a thing which the
public freely enjoyed prior to the grant. Thus a monopoly
takes something from the people. An inventor deprives the
public of nothing which it enjoyed before his discovery, but
gives something of value to the community by adding to the
sum of human knowledge."
Thus, the Court conceives of monopoly as exclusive control over a
pre-existing public market. The patent grant, on the other hand, in-
volves no such control because there is no pre-existing public market
in the patented item, and the patentee thus creates rather than restricts
commerce. In fact, innovation may be one of the best deterrents to
monopoly since it tends to create new industry which may displace
monopolistic control. A patent owner, however, as in the Zenith case,
prior to the expiration of his statutory grant, can create a public
market in the patented article by licensing others to make, use and sell
the invention. By creating such a market, as opposed to exploiting the
invention himself, the patentee's actions may then be subjected to the
antitrust laws if those actions tend to restrain trade or lessen competi-
tion. Such antitrust involvement, however, results from licensing prac-
tices and not from the patent grant itself.
It has long been recognized that the patent grant is intended to
promote technological development by providing an incentive and re-
ward for the inventor. Thus, an inherent balance must be maintained
between the public interest and the inventor's private reward. The
Supreme Court, however, has stated:
Since .. . 1829 this court has consistently held that the
primary purpose of our patent laws is not the creation of
private fortunes for the owners of patents but is "to promote
20 35 U.S.C. § 154 (1964) provides in part:
Every patent shall contain a short title of the invention and a grant to the
patentee, his heirs or assigns, for the term of seventeen years, of the right to ex-
clude others from making, using, or selling the invention throughout the United
States, ....
21
 United States v. Dubilier Condenser Corp., 289 U.S. 178, 186 (1933).
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the progress of science and useful arts." (Constitution, Art.
I, § 8) . .	 (Emphasis added.)
Thus, the public interest in maintaining a progressive economic system
lies at the root of the patent system; reward to the inventor is a
secondary means to that end. The exclusive rights granted to the
patentee to make, use and sell the patented article are the price the
public must pay to encourage and exploit his inventive genius.
The patent system, devoid of licensing abuses, accomplishes its
intended purpose." The President's Commission on the Patent System
has stated:
Agreeing that the patent system has in the past performed
well its Constitutional mandate "to promote the progress
of . . . useful arts," the Commission asked itself : What is
the basic worth of a patent system in the context of present
day conditions? The members of the Commission unan-
imously agreed that a patent system today is capable of con-
tinuing to provide an incentive to research, development, and
innovation. They have discovered no practical substitute for
the unique service it renders. 24
The patent system undoubtedly encourages much research and
development that would probably not be undertaken but for the profits
derived from patent licenses. Also, to the extent the system pro-
motes disclosure of inventions that would otherwise be kept secret, it
speeds further developments by those who gain new and useful insights
from what is disclosed and reduces the likelihood of wasteful duplica-
tive research. The system also acts as a stimulus for the investment of
risk capital in research. In many instances an investor may be reluc-
tant to invest capital in research because of the uncertainty of the out-
come of any research activity. HoweVer, by extending the prospect of
an exclusive right to the anticipated end product, the patent system
provides the investor with an additional incentive to invest.
22 Motion Picture Patents Co. v. Universal Film Mfg. Co., 243 U.S. 502, 510-11
(1917). See also Kendall v. Winsor, 62 U.S. (21 How.) 322, 327-28 (1858) where the
Court stated:
It is undeniably true, that the limited and temporary monopoly granted to
inventors was never designed for their exclusive profit or advantage; the benefit
to the public or community at large was another and doubtless the primary
object in granting and securing that monopoly.
23 Report of the President's Commission on the Patent System (1966) [hereinafter
cited as President's Commission Report]. For an appraisal of the patent system's net
contribution to economic welfare including its adverse effects, see Turner, Patents,
Antitrust And Innovation, 12 Antitrust Bull. 277 (1967) where the author cites three
adverse effects produced by the patent system. First, because of the patent monopoly,
many new ideas are not as widely utilized or applied as they would be if freely avail-
able. Second, the patent system often forces competitors of the patent holders to invest
resources in duplicating research to find other ways of obtaining the same or nearly the
same result. Finally, the patent system tends to inhibit research in areas heavily hedged
in by existing patents. In spite of these effects, it is concluded that, because of the lack
of reliable information on the net impact of the patent system on our economy, the
present system should be maintained.
24 President's Commission Report at 2.
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Because the subject matter of the licensing agreement and the
manner in which it is obtained effect directly the maintenance of a
competitive economy, the existence of licensing abuses has necessitated
the application of antitrust principles to patent law. Although the
patent misuse doctrine as originally developed was grounded solely on
a violation of the patent laws, the existence of anticompetitive licensing
practices has caused the courts to expand the doctrine to include anti-
trust standards where the patentee's conduct tends to restrain trade or
lessen competition in a patented or unpatented item. Thus, a patent
misuse may be grounded on a violation of the antitrust laws, or, the
defense may be invoked where, absent any antitrust violation, the
conduct of the patent owner violates the patent laws.
The first enunciation of the misuse doctrine came in Morton Salt
Co. v. G. S. Suppiger Co." where the patentee required, as a condition
to his licensing of a patented salt tablet dispensing machine, that the
licensee use only salt tablets manufactured by the patentee's sub-
sidiary. The Court held that such a licensing practice constituted a
patent misuse and denied the patentee infringement relief. It is unclear
whether the Court based its decision on antitrust principles or on the
general public policy behind the patent grant. The Court discussed
both theories26 but found it unnecessary to determine whether the
patent owner had violated the Clayton Act since "in any event the
maintenance of the present suit . . [was] contrary to public
policy. .	 .' 127
This language, although not conclusive on the issue, indicates that
the court impliedly recognized that a patent misuse may exist apart
from any violation of the antitrust laws. Subsequent decisions, how-
ever, did not resolve the question whether every patent misuse neces-
sarily involves an antitrust violation. For example, in the majority
opinion in Mercoid Corp. v. Minneapolis-Honeywell Regulator Co.,"
Mr. Justice Douglas combined patent misuse with antitrust violation,
stating that "[t] he legality of any attempt to bring unpatented goods
within the protection of the patent grant is measured by the anti-trust
25 314 U.S. 488 (1942).
20
 With respect to the patent policy considerations, the Court stated:
The grant to the inventor of the special privilege of a patent monopoly
carries out a public policy adopted by the Constitution and laws of the United
States. . . . But the public policy which includes inventions within the granted
monopoly excludes from it all that is not embraced in the invention. It equally
forbids the use of a patent to secure an exclusive right or limited monopoly not
granted by the Patent Office and which it is contrary to public policy to grant.
Id. at 492.
With reference to antitrust policy, the Court further stated:
It thus appears that respondent is making use of its patent monopoly to
restrain competition in the marketing of unpatented articles, salt tablets, for use
with patented machines. . .
Id. at 491.
27 Id. at 494.
28 320 U.S. 680 (1944).
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laws not by the patent law."29 In a companion case, however, Mr.
Justice Roberts considered patent misuse to be "a pure question of the
extent of the right of exclusion conferred by the patent statute. It
nowise involves the antitrust acts.""
The fact that patent misuse can be found apart from any antitrust
violation was clearly enunciated by Mr. Justice Douglas in Trans-
parent-Wrap Mach. Corp. v. Stokes & Smith Co. 81 where be stated
that
[t]he requirement that a licensee under a patent use un-
patented material or device [sic] with the patent might vi-
olate the antitrust laws but for the attempted protection of
the patent. . . . The condemnation of the practice, however,
does not depend on such a showing. Though control of the
unpatented article or device falls short of a prohibited re-
straint of trade or monopoly, it will not be sanctioned.'
This approach, although inconsistent with the language in the
Mercoid case, seems to present the better view by acknowledging the
important distinction that a patent misuse can be found in the absence
of an antitrust violation. As noted, the same goal is envisioned by both
the patent and antitrust laws, namely, the maintenance of a progressive
economy. As this common objective is sought through different statu-
tory mechanisms any attempt to combine and thereby confuse them
would frustrate their ultimate end." The Report of the Attorney Gen-
eral's Committee to Study the Antitrust Laws (Attorney General's
Committee Report) supports the view that every misuse is not a per
se violation of the antitrust laws." In pointing out the necessity of pre-
venting confusion in these two areas, the Attorney General's Committee
Report stated that, while the same conduct may violate both antitrust
and patent laws, "[f]rom some abuses of patent policy may flow conse-
quences not drastic enough to meet antitrust prerequisites of effect on
competition!'" The Zenith case" is in accord with this conclusion.
20 Id, at 684.
20 Mercoid Corp. v. Mid-Continent Co., 320 U.S. 661, 674 (1944).
31 329 U.S. 637 (1947).
32
 Id. at 641.
33 Accord, Report of the Attorney General's National Committee to Study the Anti-
trust Laws (1955) [hereinafter cited as the Attorney General's Committee Report]. The
Report states:
Holding every patent law transgression to be at the same time an antitrust
violation would, moreover, put the patent owner on a different footing than
owners of other property subject to antitrust. For antitrust has its own measure
of permissive and wrongful conduct. To say that action beyond the borders of
the patent grant is a per se antitrust violation is to ignore the Supreme Court's
distinctions between the variant statutory standards of the Sherman, Federal
Trade Commission and Clayton Acts. . . .
Id. at 254.
34 Id.
35 Attorney General's Committee Report at 254.
3° See p. 49 supra.
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Although it is now settled that patent misuse may be found in the
absence of an antitrust violation, some patent misuse cases have been
decided solely within the antitrust framework. In these cases courts
have utilized the standards prohibiting restraint of trade and lessening
of competition to determine the legality of the patentee's conduct. It
has been maintained that the legitimate rights of the patent holder
have been abrogated by the court's utilization of these antitrust prin-
ciples." An analysis of the cases prior to Zenith indicates that such a
conclusion is unwarranted, for in each case the patentee's conduct
violated the antitrust laws irrespective of his status as a patent holder.
Furthermore, by violating the antitrust laws as a patent holder, he
also violated the patent laws by extending his limited grant beyond its
statutory limit.
Morton Salt Co. v. G. S. Suppiger Co." involved a possible viola-
tion of such antitrust principles, specifically a tie-in, a license provision
requiring the use of a profit making, unpatented article with the
patented one. The Supreme Court declared such tying arrangements
to be a patent misuse based on both a violation of the patent laws,
since the patentee seeks to extend his limited grant beyond its in-
tended statutory limit, and a violation of the antitrust laws, because
the patent holder's practices tend to suppress competition and restrain
trade in the tied article." In 1952, Section 271 was introduced into the
Patent Code." Under this section,'" as subsequently interpreted, 42
certain previously prohibited tie-in practices may not constitute patent
misuse. However, the section's exemption clause specifically refers to
misuse only. Consequently, because misuse is not equivalent to an
antitrust violation, it appears that the section does not limit in any way
the application of antitrust laws to tying arrangements. 43
A Subcommittee Report for the Committee on the Judiciary"
(Subcommittee Report), which examined the antitrust problems pre-
sented by the exploitation of patents concluded that the Court has been
correct in its treatment of tie-in arrangements and should continue to
apply the same standards "because only then will the patent system
37 See Nicoson, supra note 7.
38
 314 U.S. 488 (1942).
39
 Id. at 494. See also International Salt Co. v. United States, 332 U.S. 392, 396
(1947); Mercoid Corp. v. Minneapolis-Honeywell Regulator Co., 320 U.S. 680, 684
(1944); Mercoid Corp. v. Mid-Continent Inv. Co., 320 U.S. 661, 667 (1944); B.B. Chem.
Co. v. Ellis, 314 U.S. 495, 498 (1942).
40 35 U.S.C. § 271 (1964).
41
 In general the section provides that certain tie-ins of components may be per-
missible provided the components constitute a material part of the invention, are espe-
cially adapted for use in the patented invention, and are not a staple article or commodity
of commerce suitable for substantial non-infringing use.
42
 Calhoun v. State Chem. Mfg. Co., 153 F. Supp. 293 (N.D. Ohio 1957); Sola
Elec. Co. v. General Elec. Co., 146 F. Supp. 625 (N.D. Ill. 1956).
43
 For a detailed analysis of section 271, see 66 Harv. L. Rev. 909 (1953).
44
 Staff of Subcomm. No. 5, Comm. on the Judiciary, 84th Cong., 2d Sess., Anti-
trust Problems in the Exploitation of Patents (1951) [hereinafter cited as the Subcom-
mittee Report].
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be preserved in its intended statutory sense." 45 The subcommittee based
its conclusion on the fact that " [o] nce any patentee is permitted to
tie in some other product with his lawful patent monopoly the consti-
tutional system of securing to investors a limited monopoly for their
inventions becomes a delusion!'" (Emphasis added.) The Court's
opinion in Zenith supports the Subcommittee Report's conclusion re-
garding the prohibition of tie-in practices. In fact, in discussing the
"established limits" which a patentee must not exceed in exercising his
patent rights, the Court cites the tie-in cases, stating that the patentee
"may not condition the right to use his patent on the licensee's agree-
ment to purchase, use, or sell . . . another article of commerce not
within the scope of his patent monopoly." 47 Thus, the patentee who in-
corporates a tie-in provision in his licensing agreement may be guilty
of patent misuse based on either a patent law or antitrust law violation,
depending on the consequences which flow from his particular practices.
The confrontation between patent policy and antitrust principles
exists also in the situation where the licensing agreement contains a
price fixing provision. An early case48 approved the actions of a
patentee in setting the price at which his licensee could sell the patented
product. This holding was sustained in the leading case of United States
v. General Elec. Co." where General Electric licensed Westinghouse to
manufacture and sell patented lamps at prices fixed by General Elec-
tric and based on the latter's own sales. Stressing that profit was one of
the valuable elements of a patentee's exclusive grant, the Court held
that the price fixing provision was "normally and reasonably adapted
to secure pecuniary reward for the patentee's monopoly!'"
In United States v. Line Material Co., 81 the Supreme Court split
four to four on whether the holding in General Electric should be over-
ruled; therefore, the latter decision still stands. However, since the Line
Material decision, courts have repeatedly restricted the use of price
fixing provisions, making them illegal in all but a few situations. For
example, prices may not be fixed on the basis of process patents," or
patents which cover only a part of the product," or on unpatented
components of patented combinations.'
The majority in the Attorney General's Committee Report sup-
ported the General Electric holding by stating that,
45 Id. at 12.
46 Id .
47
 395 U.S. at 136.
98 Bement v. National Harrow Co., 186 U.S. 70 (1902).
414 272 U.S. 476 (1926).
5° Id. at 490.
51 333 U.S. 287 (1948).
52 Cummer-Graham Co. v. Straight Side Basket Corp., 142 F.2d 646, 647-48 (5th
Cir. 1944); Barber-Colman Co. v. National Tool Co., 136 F.2d 339, 344 (6th Cir. 1943).
A process patent is one which covers a new method utilized in an unpatented invention.
53 United States v. General Elec. Co., 80 F. Supp. 989 (S.D.N.Y. 1948).
54
 United States v. United States Gypsum Co., 333 U.S. 364, 400-01 (1948).
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in the absence of horizontal agreement among licensees, or
any plan aimed at or resulting in industry-wide price fixing,
licenses with price fixing provisions fall within the orbit of
the patent and need not run afoul of the antitrust laws."
(Emphasis added.)
The minority expressed the opinion that price fixing arrangements were
outside the scope of the patent grant and should be proscribed by the
antitrust laws under any circumstances." However, in the view of the
committee, a patentee commits a misuse based on an antitrust violation
only where the particular provision tends to restrain trade or suppress
competition.
Thus, it has been shown that, with few exceptions, the so-called
patent-antitrust cases involve attempts to use a patent for purposes
for which it was not intended. In view of both the cases prior to Zenith
and the determination that every misuse is not a per se violation of
the antitrust laws, it seems clear that the Court's treatment of these
cases
afford [s] ample means for preserving the rights of patent
owners in the legitimate exploitation of their property, while
at the same time correcting patent abuse and safeguarding
competitive opportunity.'"
Since patent misuse may be found without a concurrent violation of
the antitrust laws, it becomes important to resolve whether the stan-
dards utilized by the Court in Zenith to determine the legality of
HRI's package licensing and royalty base practices continue to safe-
guard the patentee's rights under the patent grant.
III. PACKAGE LICENSING AND ROYALTY BASE: THE ZENITH
STANDARD OF MISUSE
The Supreme Court in Zenith, in holding that patent misuse exists
when a patent holder conditions the grant of a patent license upon
payment of royalties based on a percentage of the total sales, regardless
of whether the licensee uses the patent, distinguished Automatic Radio
Mfg. Co. v. Hazeltine Research, Inc., 58
 which upheld a license provi-
sion identical to the one in the Zenith case. In reversing the court of
appeals, the Supreme Court stated that its decision was not contrary
to the holding in Automatic Radio since that decision "is not authority
for the proposition that patentees have carte blanche authority to
condition the grant of patent licenses upon the payment of royalties
on unpatented articles."" Analysis of the Automatic Radio decision
confirms that conclusion.
In Automatic Radio the licensee was not obligated to use any of
the patents but was required to pay royalties based on a percentage of
55
 Attorney General's Committee Report at 235.
58 Id.
57
 Subcommittee Report at 25.
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 339 U.S. 827 (1950).
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total sales. The Court held that "it is not per se a misuse of patents to
measure the consideration by a percentage of the licensee's sales." 6° In
reaching that conclusion the Court distinguished between the privilege
of use and actual use, stating that royalties could be exacted for the
former as well as the latter, and that " [s]ound business judgment could
indicate that such payment represents the most convenient method of
fixing the business value of the privileges granted by the licensing
agreement."el
The decision in Automatic Radio, therefore, supports the proposi-
tion that a royalty based on a percentage of total sales, absent other
circumstances, is not illegal. In reaching its decision, the Court ob-
served that the presence of coercion might have produced a different
result.° The facts in Automatic Radio and Zenith are essentially the
same with the addition in Zenith of the fatal element of coercion. The
Zenith opinion is not contrary to the holding in Automatic Radio but
clarifies it by indicating that the latter applies only to the narrow situa-
tion where no coercion exists and the parties, bargaining as equals,
freely agree that such a royalty base will serve the convenience of both.
In discussing the antitrust effect of the royalty base formula, the
Court in Automatic Radio distinguished the cases involving tie-in ar-
rangements by noting that such a base does not require the purchase
of any goods nor does it restrict the licensee's right to manufacture or
sell any other product not covered by the patent.° The plaintiff con-
ceded that the tie-in cases were not directly on point, but urged that
such a royalty provision is "identical in principle" with the tie-in cases
and constitutes a misuse because it ties in a payment on unpatented
goods." Reliance was placed on the decision in United States v. U.S.
Gypsum Co." where the Court struck down a license provision which
measured royalties by a percentage of the value of all gypsum prod-
ucts produced by the licensee, patented or unpatented. There it was
held that such conduct constituted a conspiracy to restrict the produc-
tion of unpatented goods in violation of the Sherman Act." The Court
in Automatic Radio distinguished the Gypsum case by noting that it
was not the method of computing the royalties that was objectionable,
but rather that method plus evidence of an understanding that only
patented goods would be sold.
In enunciating the principle underlying the tie-in cases, the Court
in Automatic Radio stated: "that which is condemned as against public
eo 339 U.S. at 834.
61 Id.
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 The Court stated: "there is no conditioning of the license grant upon the accep-
tance of another and different license." Id. at 831. Although coercion was alleged in the
district court, it was not pressed in either the court of appeals or the Supreme Court.
In noting this point the Court stated "[i]n any event there is nothing available in the
record to support the averment [of coercion] . . . ." Id.
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64 Id. at 832.
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policy by the 'Tie-in' cases is the extension of the monopoly of the
patent to create another monopoly or restraint of competition. . . . 1167
(Emphasis added.) Providing for a royalty based on a percentage of
the licensee's total sales produces neither of these two effects." Implicit
in both the Zenith and the Automatic Radio holdings is the recognition
that the patent owner, who has the right to market the use of his patent
at a reasonable return, may achieve such a return utilizing a royalty
based on total sales regardless of patent use.
Reasoning that the majority opinion overrules Automatic Radio,
Mr. Justice Harlan, in his dissent in Zenith, stated that the presence or
absence of coercion should not be the determinative factor since such
a standard "is likely to prove exceedingly difficult to apply. . ." 119 In
addition, he observed that the Court failed to answer what he con-
sidered to be the major question at issue, namely, whether percentage-
of-sales royalty provisions should be held to constitute patent misuse in
all circumstances regardless of the presence or absence of coercion.
Had the Court answered this question in the affirmative, it would have
been unnecessary to determine the presence of coercion. The dissent
also observed that a royalty based on total sales may have two un-
desirable consequences. 7° First, such a provision may reduce the
licensee's incentive to "invent around" the patent or otherwise acquire
a substitute which costs less, because the licensee realizes that, despite
his efforts, he must pay the royalty regardless of use. This failure of
the licensee to substitute cheaper "inputs" will cause the price of the
product to be higher than would be the case had substitution oc-
curred. 71
Second, under certain conditions, a percentage-of-sales royalty
may enable the patent owner to reap profits, above the norm for the
industry or economy, which are not properly attributable to the li-
censee's use of the patent but, rather, to other factors which cause the
licensee's situation to differ from one of "perfect competition." Such a
situation cannot arise when royalties are based on actual use."
The Zenith decision provides a safeguard against these undesir-
able results while maintaining the right of the parties to bargain freely
between themselves in arriving at what they consider to be a reasonable
return. The coercion standard utilized by the Court will render illegal
any attempt by the patent holder to force upon his licensee any provi-
sion which the licensee deems undesirable. This is implicit in the
67 339 U.S. at 832.
68 Other courts have reached the same conclusion on similar grounds: H-P-M Dcv.
Corp. v. Watson-Stillman Co., 71 F. Supp. 906, 912 (D.N.J. 1947) ; American Optical Co.
v. New Jersey Optical Co., 58 F. Supp. 601, 606 (D. Mass. 1944) ; Ohio Citizens Trust Co.
v. Airway Elec. Appliance Corp., 56 F. Supp. 1010, 1012 (ND. Ohio 1944).
439 395 U.S. at 141.
70 Justice Harlan referred to and adopted the reasoning of the following article:
Baxter, Legal Restrictions on Exploitation of the Patent Monopoly: An Economic
Analysis, 76 YALE L.J. 267 (1966).
71 Id. at 299-301, 302-06.
72 Id. at 300-01, 302-06, 331-32.
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Court's statement: "we also think patent misuse inheres in a pat-
entee's insistence on a percentage-of-sales royalty, regardless of use,
and his rejection of licensee proposals to pay only for actual. use.""
(Emphasis added.) For example, should the licensee realize, after a
complete assessment of the situation, that the patent holder's scheme
for royalty payments fits the licensee's particular needs, the Zenith
case would allow the agreement to stand. On the other hand, should the
patentee's proposal not meet the licensee's particular needs or have
results which the licensee considers undesirable, the Zenith holding
will protect him. This flexibility would be lacking in Justice Harlan's
approach."
Prior to the Zenith decision, the law as to package licensing was
relatively clear; voluntary package licensing was not a misuse, whereas
mandatory package licensing was. However, the exact meaning of the
word "mandatory," or the degree of coercion necessary to make a
package license mandatory, was not clear. The decision in Zenith helps
to clarify this uncertainty.
Like the percentage-of-sales royalty base, package licensing is not
per se illegal. In fact, such an arrangement may be desirable in that
it "avoids troublesome questions of infringement, complex bookkeeping,
the difficulty of determining which patents cover the present and future
needs of the licensee, cost differences, and similar practical consider-
ations.""
However, the practice of package licensing can be misused, for
example, by coercing a licensee to accept a license under one patent on
condition of acceptance of a license under another patent, or the entire
package. By utilizing the leverage of the desired patent in this manner,
the patentee forces the licensee to accept unwanted patents. This prac-
tice was first condemned by the Supreme Court in Ethyl Gasoline
Corp. v. United States" where the Court analogized it to the tie-in
cases and said "[t]he patent monopoly of one invention may no more
be enlarged for the exploitation of a monopoly of another [inven-
tion] . ."77
Extending this reasoning to copyrights, the Court in United States
v. Paramount Pictures, Inc." held illegal a refusal to license one copy-
right unless another copyright was accepted. In reaching its decision,
the Court relied on the opinion in the Ethyl Gasoline case. Although
the holding in Paramount did not specifically refer to mandatory
78 395 U.S. at 139.
74 The White House Task Force Report on Antitrust Policy concludes:
Our proposed remedy [that of requiring a licensor to license on equivalent
terms to all qualified licensees] will not require that the courts or administrative
agencies determine what are reasonable royalties; royalties would continue to
be bargained between patent owners and initial licensees. (Emphasis added.)
BNA Antitrust & Trade Reg. Rep. 1, 11 (May 21, 1969).
75
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package licensing of patents, its rationale is applicable to the patent
area because the decision was based on patent as well as copyright law.
Relying on the Ethyl Gasoline, Paramount and Automatic Radio"
decisions, the Attorney General's Committee Report condemned the
practice of mandatory package licensing. The Committee attempted to
formulate guidelines as to when package licensing constitutes a misuse.
Package licensing should be prohibited only where there is
refusal, after a request, to license less than a complete pack-
age. Additionally, the licensor should not be required to
justify on any proportional basis the royalty rate for less
than the complete package, so long as the rate set is not so
disproportionate as to amount to a refusal to license less than
the complete package.8° (Emphasis added.)
Utilizing the standard set out by the Attorney General's Com-
mittee Report, the court in American Securit Co. v. Shatterproof Glass
Corp."' condemned the practice of mandatory package licensing. There
the patentee offered the licensee a package license providing that the
royalty be calculated according to the amount of the licensee's sales.
Unlike Zenith, however, the licensee requested some but not all of the
patents included in the package. The patent owner refused to license
less than the entire package thus forcing the licensee to take unwanted
patents. The court held that this practice constituted unlawful coer-
cion and a misuse of the patent monopoly.82
Contrary to the views expressed by Justice Harlan in his dissent-
ing opinion in Zenith, judicial guidelines describing what constitutes
coercion are emerging. The Zenith case represents a major step in de-
termining these guidelines. For example, according to the Securit case
and the Attorney General's Committee Report, a refusal after a
request to license less than the whole package constitutes sufficient
coercion to result in misuse. The case is not as clear, however, where
the coercion is less direct, such as when the patentee agrees to a
request to license individual patents but charges the same royalty for
7' Although the Court in Automatic Radio considered only the royalty base issue
and expressly left the question of mandatory package licensing undecided, dicta in the
decision evidenced a hostile attitude toward the practice. The Court stated: "[Obese
cases have condemned schemes . . . conditioning the granting of a license under one
patent upon the acceptance of another and different license." 339 U.S. at 830-31.
80
 Attorney General's Committee Report at 239-40. The Report also noted that,
where a substantial group of patents are offered at a fiat royalty rate, the de-
letion of one or several specified patents need not affect the rate.... Moreover,
where several "per piece" licenses are requested and offered, the mere fact that
the sum of the "per piece" license royalties exceeds the package royalty rate
should not of itself be considered a condition that all or no patents be taken,
again, so long as the "per piece" rate is not so disproportionate as to amount
to a refusal to license less than the complete package.
Id. at 240.
81
 268 F.2d 769 (3d Cir. 1959), cert. denied, 361 U.S. 902 (1959). For a discussion
of the case, see 73 Ham L. Rev. 1628 (1960).
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the individual patents as he would have charged for the entire package,
or when the royalty for the package is less than that charged for indi-
vidual patents, such as HRI's $435,000-$500,000-$150,000 offer. In
these two situations the decision in Zenith provides some direction.
In the first situation, where the royalty for the individual patents
is the same as that for the entire package, the Court of Appeals for the
Seventh Circuit in Apex Elec. Mfg. Co. v. Altorfer Bros. Co." noted
that where there was no refusal to license less than all of three patents
in the package, it was not a misuse for the patent holder to insist that
exactly the same royalty be paid whether under one, two or three
patents. The decision may be justified on the basis of the Attorney
General's Committee standard that the licensor should not be required
to justify on any proportional basis the royalty rate for less than the
complete package "so long as the rate set is not so disproportionate as
to amount to a refusal to license less than the complete package!" B a
The Seventh Circuit in Zenith held that the 50%-80%-100% li-
cense proposal was not unlawful economic coercion and thus did not
constitute a patent misuse. In reaching its decision the court relied on
the Apex case and the fact that "W here were only three HRI patents
in general use in 1959 and therefore the formula appears reasonable
in light of commercial realities!"Sj
 The court presumably determined
that, under the circumstances, the "per piece" rate was not so dispro-
portionate as to amount to a refusal to license less than the complete
package.
With respect to HRI's $435,000-$500,000-$150,000 license pro-
posal, the court held that there was sufficient evidence to support a
finding of unlawful coercion. The terms, simply stated, offered the
"total" package at a substantially lower rate ($150,000) than the two
color patent packages ($435,000 and $500,000). These terms, together
with the strong evidence introduced in the district court to the effect
that HRI realized the misuse consequences of its license proposals,"
83 238 F.2d 867 (1956).
84 See note 82 supra.
85 388 F.2d at 34.
80 See Brief for Petitioner at 108-109. The brief quotes the following memorandum
prepared by Hazeltine's executive vice president and patent counsel:
The Legal Problem (Patent 'Misuse).
This, simply stated, is that we may not get ourselves in a position where
we are forcing a licensee to take a license under all our patents in order to get
those he wants. He must be free to make his own selection of those he wants
without being blackmailed to recognize others. If we do this, the courts will
not enforce our patents until we purge ourselves of this "misuse of patents."
That can be a very disastrous penalty if we can not purge ourselves quickly,
and it conceivably could take us six years to do so.
This legal problem is by no means new but it has assumed a more threaten-
ing nature in view of a recent court decision American Securit Co. v. Shatter-
proof Glass Corp., wherein a company was held to have misused its patents by
telling a licensee he could have all patents or only one but that the rate was
the same either way. This decision implies that the rate for one must be pro-
portionately smaller than the rate for all in order to be legal.
This is precisely the situation with HRI. Zenith wants a license under only
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caused the court to find "little difference between outright refusal to
license less than a package and the economic coercion of HRI found,
with reason, by the district court here."' Viewed in this light, the
court, citing the Attorney General's Committee Report, made the
determination that, unlike the 50%, 80%, 100% offer, the 1962 pro-
posal and its surrounding circumstances indicated that the "per piece"
rate was so disproportionate as to amount to a refusal to license less
than the complete package.
With respect to the package licensing issue, therefore, Zenith re-
affirms prior case law and, in addition, enunciates further guidelines to
determine the legality of such license provisions. It is evident from the
decision that voluntary package licensing is still not a misuse of the
patents. It is also clear from the court's decision regarding the 50%-
80%-100%a formula, that it is not per se a misuse to charge the same
royalty rate for individual patents as would be charged for the entire
package. Equally clear is the warning that the number of patents in
general use together with the circumstances surrounding the making
of the offer, including the intention of the parties, may render a seem-
ingly innocent provision a misuse of the patent, as was the case with
HRI's $435,000-$500,000-$150,000 license offer.
CONCLUSION
The Court in Zenith clearly established that every patent misuse
is not a per se violation of the antitrust laws. Apart from the applica-
tion of antitrust principles, patent misuse continues to maintain its
independent status as a check on the patent holder who seeks to exploit
his grant in contravention of the public policy on which the patent sys-
tem is based. Seen in this light the doctrine poses no threat to those
patent holders who confine themselves to the limited scope of their
statutory grant.
Furthermore, it is evident that the so-called "patent-antitrust"
cases do not represent a basic conflict between patent and antitrust
law but rather define the line beyond which the patent holder no longer
enjoys the protection of the patent laws and confronts the antitrust
laws. This line drawing is necessary to safeguard the public interest
and is best achieved by the application of a rule of reason which re-
quires that "there be full inquiry to determine whether the challenged
conduct is in furtherance of the patentee's legitimate exploitation of his
a few important patents of their own choosing. We will have to offer them at
less than our present royalty rate for all, or run the risk of running afoul of
the law and incurring a severe penalty
Also quoted were the patent counsel's handwritten notes which included the following
remark:
So what have we gained for the risk of misuse charge. The whole thing is
still apt to be viewed for just what we intended—a transparent attempt to
force them into package.
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invention or whether it is the means to other ends."" Utilization of
this approach achieves a balance between the patentee's rights and
those of the public. The Zenith case adopts this "rule of reason" ap-
proach and succesfully maintains the necessary balance. The majority
makes it clear that an inquiry into the total factual situation should
determine the legality of a particular course of conduct. This approach
provides the proper protection for the rights of the patent holder, the
licensee and the public.
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